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Metro infrastructure planning in Amsterdam: how are social issues managed in
the absence of environmental and social impact assessment?
Lara K. Mottee a,b, Jos Arts a, Frank Vanclay a, Fiona Miller b and Richard Howitt b
aDepartment of Cultural Geography, Faculty of Spatial Sciences, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands; bDepartment of
Geography & Planning, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
ABSTRACT
Amsterdam’s North-South Metro Line (NZL) megaproject has had a long eventful history. From
the initial proposal in the 1990s, through construction in the 2000s to 2010s, to its opening in
2018, the NZL overcame many challenges. Several geotechnical incidents in the Vijzelgracht
neighbourhood in 2008 cost the City of Amsterdam and the Dutch government millions of
Euros. These incidents required complex recovery management actions, and there was
a complete re-evaluation of the project, resulting in extensive reformulation of the project’s
communications and impact management strategies, and in more-transparent public partici-
pation. Despite NZL’s significance, it never underwent any formal Environmental and Social
Impact Assessment (ESIA), thus it provides an interesting case to consider how social impacts
are addressed when there is no formal ESIA. Drawing on document review, semi-structured
interviews, and a focus group, we considered the experiences of key decision-makers and
project team members to learn how social impacts were assessed and managed over time in
the absence of ESIA. We conclude that, when combined with appropriate urban governance
frameworks, applying ESIA in urban and transport planning would improve the assessment and
management of the social impacts of future megaproject infrastructure developments.
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In an era in which it is normally expected that Impact
Assessment (IA) is a key component of decision-
making about infrastructure planning (Banhalmi-
Zakar et al. 2018), it is unusual to find examples
where megaprojects are approved and implemented
without mandatory Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA) and/or Social Impact Assessment (SIA). Most inter-
national agencies, multilateral donors, lenders and
industry now require an integrated Environmental
and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) that evaluates
the effects of the projects they sponsor and captures
the interrelationships between society and the
impacted environment (Dendena and Corsi 2015;
Vanclay and Hanna 2019; Vanclay 2020). In the case
of the Netherlands, however, despite a well-
established Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
system and practice (Wood 2003; Runhaar et al.
2013), urban transport infrastructure projects are not
necessarily subject to formal ESIA. This is due to the
screening regulations in Dutch law. Yet, megaprojects
have many significant multi-faceted impacts: they cost
billions of euros, transform local economies and envir-
onments, involve multiple private and public stake-
holders, and are technically and politically complex
(Van Marrewijk et al. 2008; Flyvbjerg 2014; Sanchez-
Cazorla et al. 2016; Vanclay 2017). Although ESIA is
internationally recognised as an integrated process of
acknowledging and assessing environmental and
social impacts prior to planned projects, programs
and policy initiatives (Dendena and Corsi 2015), SIA is
not consistently enforced globally (Esteves et al. 2012;
Parsons et al. 2019), nor is it a mandatory requirement
in Dutch EIA legislation. Thus, research on projects in
the Netherlands provides an opportunity to analyse
how social impacts are addressed in projects that
have no formal ESIA, and to consider the added value
of ESIA in understanding, assessing and managing
social impacts.
Amsterdam’s North-South Metro Line (Noord-Zuid
Metrolijn) (NZL) commenced operation on 22 July 2018
after decades of controversy. It first appeared in
Amsterdam’s city planning in the 1968 stadsspoor [city
rail] strategic transport plan. Originally proposed to sup-
port Amsterdam’s booming population and to reduce
the number of vehicles in the city centre, the project
experienced political, engineering and financial pro-
blems. Work was completely halted for about a year
following safety concerns arising from geotechnical inci-
dents in 2008 in the Vijzelgracht neighbourhood. Despite
significant time delays, billions of euros in over-runs of
public expenditure, significant loss of trust by the local
community in the municipal government, and loss of its
social licence to operate (Jijelava and Vanclay 2017, 2018),
the Municipality eventually completed the NZL and
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claimed it as a success. The metro operator, GVB, also
claimed there is growing popularity of the NZL amongst
passengers (GVB 2019). The Municipality attributed this
success to its revised communication strategy, which
rebuilt community trust following the Vijzelgracht inci-
dents (Schuurman and Sheerazi 2013; van den Ende and
van Marrewijk 2019). The NZL provides the ‘missing link’
in Amsterdam’s metro network, connecting the growing
northern suburbs (Amsterdam Noord) to the historic city
centre and the economic centre in southern suburbs
(Amsterdam Zuid). Nevertheless, the social impacts aris-
ing from its operation – and should there be any future
expansion of the metro network – will need to be
addressed via the urban governance processes for land-
use planning at the city level.
Given that there was no formal ESIA for the NZL, this
paper explores how the social impacts of large-scale
urban transport projects are assessed and managed in
the absence of ESIA. We also provide recommenda-
tions to planners and decision-makers about how to
better address social impacts. The specific questions
investigated are: (1) Howwere the social impacts of the
NZL assessed?; (2) How were they managed over time?;
and (3) How might their management have benefitted
from formal SIA?
This paper is structured in six parts including an
introduction, background to the project (NZL), a brief
methodology, an empirical section incorporating our
research findings, discussion and further reflections
on the implications of our findings for the future, and
a conclusion. Our research findings primarily draw on
document review, interviews with key decision-
makers and NZL project team members, and a follow-
up focus group with staff from the Municipality. We
reflect on how decision-making around key issues in
the NZL (e.g. project management, strategic planning,
urban governance, community engagement, and the
assessment and management of social impacts) influ-
enced the social outcomes of the project. We con-
clude with recommendations on the need to identify,
assess and manage social impacts of future urban
metro infrastructure projects at different spatial
scales, and suggest how this might inform future
city planning.
Background to the North-South Metro Line
The NZL is a 9.7 km underground metro link connect-
ing the office district of Zuidas in the South of
Amsterdam, passing under the city centre to
Amsterdam central station, and the residential suburbs
north of the River IJ (see Figure 1). Six new stations
were constructed: Europaplein, De Pijp, Vijzelgracht,
Rokin, Noorderpark, Noord, and augmentations were
made to include stops at two existing stations:
Amsterdam Zuid and Amsterdam Centraal.
In the 1968 Stadsspoor (city rail) metro plan, four
metro lines were conceived: two East-West lines, a Ring
Line, and the NZL. However, construction of one East-
West Line (later known as the East Line), which used
a cut-and-cover technique that was very damaging to
the existing urban form, led to community protests at
Nieuwmarkt in 1975. This halted progress on all lines (Van
Lohuizen 1989; Rooijendijk 2005; Valliant 2017; van den
Ende and van Marrewijk 2019). New construction techni-
ques that promised to be less damaging to the urban
environment, and that were financially and technically
feasible for tunnelling through Amsterdam’s soft water-
logged soils, were identified in the 1980s, leading to the
metro plan being reconsidered (Van Lohuizen 1989; van
den Ende and vanMarrewijk 2019). Several investigations
supported construction of the NZL, but a municipal refer-
endum in 1996 revealed limited public support for the
project (Valliant 2017). However, an insufficient number
of votes were cast in the referendum for the results to be
binding according to Dutch law (van den Ende and van
Marrewijk 2019).
Once financing was negotiated with the Dutch
National government (which took several years),
the construction of the NZL was approved by the
Municipal Council of Amsterdam on 21 June 2000
(Valliant 2017). Investigations into the proposed pro-
ject revealed sufficient merit, partly because of con-
fidence in the new boring technologies, as well as
the critical need to reduce automobile use, ensure
accessibility, and promote liveability in the rapidly-
growing city (Faithful and Gould Consult 2005).
Following various re-alignments during design and
lengthy procurement negotiations (especially relat-
ing to responsibility for risk), the final investment
decision to proceed with the NZL was made on
9 October 2002. Pre-construction activities started
in December 2002, with construction officially com-
mencing on 22 April 2003 (Faithful and Gould
Consult 2005).
There were significant geotechnical problems
encountered during construction. The worst occurred
in 2008 when a groundwater leak in the underground
station cavity in the Vijzelgracht neighbourhood
caused subsidence and damage to nearby houses,
forcing the evacuation of people from their homes.
Due to safety and geotechnical construction con-
cerns, this halted the project for almost a year.
However, construction recommenced in 2009 after
an investigation known as the Veerman Committee,
which reviewed the viability of the project and its
increasing cost and timeframe, recommended that
the project proceed.
The Veerman Committee concluded that the
Municipality needed to: increase transparency in risk com-
munication; improve the involvement of the public in the
planning process; and increase compensation. A revised
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communications strategywas developed that focused on
two-way communication and introduced onlinemedia to
receive public complaints and feedback (Schuurman and
Sheerazi 2013).
The project eventually opened on 22 July 2018 after
40 years planning and 16 years construction (Gemeente
Amsterdam n.d.). The total cost of the project increased
from the original contemporary equivalent of 1.4 billion
euros (Faithful and Gould Consult 2005) to approxi-
mately 3.1 billion euros when the project was complete
(Gemeente Amsterdam n.d.). Key aspects in the project
history that are relevant to assessing and managing
social impacts are summarised in Table 1.
Environmental Impact Assessment and the
North-South Metro Line
Under the Dutch Environmental Management Act (Wet
milieubeheer 1979) and Environmental Impact
Assessment Decree (Besluit milieueffectrapportage 1994),
at the time of the NZL, EIA was only mandatory for trans-
port projects of a specific type (specifically metropolitan
tramways, elevated or underground rail, bus lanes, or
magnetic levitation railways) and that are more than
5 km in length and outside a built environment, or if
they are in an environmentally sensitive area. Therefore,
therewas no legal requirement for formal EIA for the NZL.
Figure 1. Noord/Zuidlijn (Visser & Smit Bouw n.d.).
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Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) was con-
ducted in the Netherlands to assess the impacts of devel-
opments identified in strategic national, provincial and
regional spatial plans, and transportation plans (Fischer
1999). For instance, SEAs were conducted for strategic
plans of the province of Noord Holland, which included
the NZL being part of the future transportation network.
However, the outcomes of these assessments were not
considered in the planning process of the NZL itself.
During construction, the environmental permits required
the contractor to identify management strategies and to
monitor noise, vibration, surfacewater, groundwater, and
soil movement. All of these issues were relevant to moni-
tor, as they could lead to negative social impacts, for
example, in terms of liveability (amenity) disturbance or
property damage from subsidence. These impacts could
be particularly significant for vulnerable groups (e.g. the
elderly, disabled or young families) if left unmanaged.
However, these requirements are very limited in compar-
ison to current goodpractice SIA,which includes all social,
cultural, psychological and health impacts felt or experi-
enced at any social grouping level (Vanclay 2002; Barrow
2010; Vanclay et al. 2015).
Methodology
This research used a multi-methods qualitative case
study approach that included document analysis,
semi-structured interviews, and a follow-up focus
group. Field inspection was undertaken so that the
primary researcher (an Australian) would become
familiar with any place names that would come up in
interviews. The North-South Metro Line was studied
because it was a megaproject, had significant social
issues, and no ESIA had been conducted. It is also the
most recently constructed metro line in a major city in
the Netherlands.
Seventeen interviews, each of 1–2 h duration, were
conducted during 2017 and 2018 with relevant key
informants knowledgeable about the project.
Interviews were conducted face-to-face and/or via
email/phone/skype in English. Some interview materi-
als were translated into Dutch and one interview was
conducted in Dutch with an interpreter. The interview
questions were semi-structured to allow for free-
flowing conversation and focused on issues relevant
to managing the social impacts of the NZL and
Table 1. Timeline of key events relating to the North-South Line (compiled from Faithful and Gould Consult 2005; Soetenhorst
2011; Schuurman and Sheerazi 2013; Valliant 2017; Gemeente Amsterdam 2018 and interview data).
Date Event
1968 The Municipal Council of Amsterdam agrees to start work on the East line and made plans to build the NZL as part of the
Plan Stadsspoor. The Plan Stadsspoor was proposed to phase a metro network, which connected all neighbourhoods in
Amsterdam. Four lines were conceived with two East-West lines, a Ring Line and a North-South Line.
1971 Construction of one East-West Line (which later became the East line) started, using a cut-and-cover technique.
1975 Riots broke out in the Nieuwmarket neighbourhood. Protestors opposed city plans to demolish further housing. The
proposal to build the NZL is removed and it is announced that the East line will be the only metro line in Amsterdam.
1980s A ‘sneltram’ between Amstelveen and Amsterdam is investigated as an alternative to metro. A number of internal studies
are conducted by the Municipality into the feasibility of constructing the NZL.
1988–1989 A metro line between the North and South of Amsterdam is publicly announced. A study is commissioned to investigate
improvements in public transport.
1995 The NZL route is identified by the Municipal Council of Amsterdam and plans are released for public consultation. Project
boundaries are defined in the landuse plan. Technical studies are undertaken to help the Municipality decide whether or
not to proceed.
1996 The Municipal Council of Amsterdam decides to approve the project 27 November 1996 to request funding from the Dutch
Ministry of Public Transport. Costs are estimated at 1.4 billion equivalent euros, with a delivery date of 2005. The Dutch
Ministry of Public Transport (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat) commits to financing the project.
1996–1997 The Municipality decides to hold a public referendum on the NZL. On 25 June 1997, 65% voting against the project.
However, the poll was non-binding because the number of voters was insufficient.
1997–2001 Further consultancy studies are conducted to quantify the risks of the NZL. The procurement process begins and
negotiations begin. A subsidy is added to the overall budget for the compensation of risks and accepted on 21 June 2000
by the Municipal Council. The budget and sub-contracts are amended several times to include contingency for risks.
9 October 2002 The Municipal Council of Amsterdam makes a definite decision to proceed with the project with a start budget of
1,461 million (excluding risks).
December 2002 Pre-construction activities commence.
22 April 2003 Construction commenced.
2003–2007 Problems arise with the NZL management team and delays and costs experienced.
19 June 2008 A leakage occurs in the west wall of the building pit of Vijzelgracht station resulting in major soil subsidence of adjacent
houses.
2008, 9–10 September Further leakages occur causing soil subsidence in adjacent buildings at Vijzelgracht.
Construction is halted.
March 2009 The Veerman Committee is enacted to provide advice to the Amsterdam Municipal Council.
June 2009 The Veerman Committee presents its report, advising Amsterdam to complete the metro line. It concluded that the project
will take another 8 years and cost up to 3.1 billion euros. The Committee made over 40 recommendations about
progressing further with the project, including that the municipality must communicate more openly and transparently
with the people of Amsterdam and provide more compensation for inconvenience and damage experienced by residents
and businesses.
September 2009 Construction recommences on the NZL following the decision to proceed from the Veerman Committee and allocation of
additional funds.
2010 Boring successfully completed. There are further delays and project costs increased.
A change in communications strategy with the aim to rebuild trust with the people of Amsterdam was officially
implemented.
22 July 2018 NZL begins operation.
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transport projects generally. The principles of ethical
social research (Vanclay et al. 2013) were followed, and
the research was conducted under a protocol
approved by Macquarie University.
The questions were developed from a review of case
study documents and our previous research (Mottee
and Howitt 2018; Mottee et al. 2020) and were grouped
under six key themes:
(1) Business case, policy and strategic need
(2) Planning approval pathway and assessment of
impacts
(3) Key political decisions, governance and propo-
sal modifications
(4) Initial and ongoing stakeholder and community
engagement
(5) Cost-over runs, funding arrangements and pro-
ject management
(6) Long-term socio-economic effects of the pro-
ject; Long-term management and monitoring
of social impacts
A focus groupwas conducted in January 2019with repre-
sentatives of the urban and transport planning depart-
ments of the Municipality of Amsterdam. Some of the
focus group participants had been interviewees. The
intention was to discuss the case and seek feedback on
our findings from earlier interviews. The focus group
representatives were asked to reflect on the following
statements:
(1) Feasibility and ex-ante assessments should have
better considered social consequences and oppor-
tunities for the local community in the short and
long-term.
(2) Early public consultation during feasibility should
have engaged all sections of the community, and
placed greater value on their contribution to the
design process.
(3) The ‘need’ for the project should have been con-
tinually evaluated against the original social objec-
tives during design planning phases and up until
delivery.
(4) The communication strategy post-Veerman com-
mittee allowed for flexibility in developing man-
agement strategies in response to social impacts as
they arose, however, appropriate budgets and
resources could have been allocated formanaging
social impacts from early stages of planning.
(5) There was a disconnect between the assessment,
management and reporting Follow-up of social
impacts at the project-scale and city-wide scale.
The focus group and interviews were audio-recorded,
and interviews transcribed using NVivo-11. Thematic
coding and reflexive diary notes were used as part of
the analysis.
Interviewees were initially identified in discussion with
staff at the Municipality of Amsterdam and from a review
of publicly available documents. A snowball approach
was used to identify additional people to interview.
Interviewees included: Aldermen (transport and plan-
ning); Urban Planners; Engineers; Project Managers; and
Environmental and Stakeholder Engagement profes-
sionals who all worked for the Municipality at the time
of the project. Not all focus group interviewees worked
directly on the NZL project, but some had a role in plan-
ning future projects for the Municipality.
Reflections on assessing and managing the
social impacts of the North-South Metro Line
In analysing our data, five themes that reflected inter-
viewees’ experiences and observations about assessing
and managing the social impacts of the NZL emerged:
engineering design and project management; strategic
and landuse planning; stakeholder and community
engagement; managing social impacts and risks; and
the potential role of ESIA. We discuss them below.
Engineering design and project management
All interviewees emphasised that an early constraint
on engineering design and project planning was the
commitment by the Municipal Council of Amsterdam
that there would be no demolition of houses. This
was necessary because the problems experienced
with the construction of the East Line – with its cut-
and-cover technique, demolition of houses, and com-
munity protests – meant that the Council was not
able to progress planning the metro network for
fear of community opposition (van den Ende and
van Marrewijk 2019). As one interviewee (a
Municipal Planner during the 1970s and 80s)
remarked, ‘you might as well offer your resignation
if you were to suggest expanding the metro in
Amsterdam as a solution to its transport problems!’.
The political decision that there would be no demoli-
tion of houses had significant influence on the engi-
neering feasibility study during planning:
All kinds of studies were made and there was one big
constraint – given the impacts of the construction
process the East line had on the city, that was, no
demolition possible!. So, we really had to look into
new technologies. [Project Manager]
Early engineering feasibility studies prioritised tunnel-
ling methods to convince the Municipal Council that
the metro was feasible and posed no risk to the com-
munity or property:
In the late 80s, early 90s, we were convinced it was
feasible. We then had to show that it’s not only feasi-
ble, but actually doable. The only way of doing so was
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implementing from the very start a very rigorous risk
management philosophy. [Project Manager]
The focus on avoiding property impacts influenced
route design in terms of using existing streets to
avoid tunnelling beneath buildings. To achieve this,
project management initially primarily focused on the
technical and financial aspects of tunnelling in the
special conditions of Amsterdam’s soils. A former engi-
neer recalled the project management team’s unwill-
ingness to accept that there may be additional costly
risks and challenges due to inexperience with tunnel-
ling in Amsterdam’s soils:
That was the first thing, a one-liner, “We are boring, no
problem”. So, and then the second one-liner was, “we
are going deep”, a big depth, you understand? Then
you have no problem. That was two one-liners that
they used to continue to convince the people of
Amsterdam that there was no problem. [Engineer]
Interviewees reflecting on the technology noted that
this choice resulted in increased financial and non-
financial costs to the public and the project due to:
design changes to avoid houses; the deep excavation;
prolonged construction periods; and safety investiga-
tions. Several interviewees involved in the stakeholder
engagement and environmental management aspects
of the project reported that the early focus on techni-
cal matters came at the expense of other priorities,
including the assessment and management of social
and environmental risks. Some felt that their expertise
did not have equal weight in key project decisions.
One interviewee noted that they had limited power
within the organisation to question technical aspects
of the project (such as station location, design and
construction) as their role was to focus on the non-
technical and soft issues. They also felt that they were
not being properly informed about project risks, and
therefore they could not adequately inform the public.
Ultimately, as another interviewee reflected, the
majority of design and project management issues
were technical rather than about the potential social
impacts of the project:
They hadn’t been thinking about what the [social]
impact would really be and how it would be felt by
people who live close by, or have their shops in the
area. If you think it’s a technical problem, with
a technical challenge, your focus is on the technical.
That’s one of the real root causes of where things went
wrong. [Stakeholder Engagement Professional]
The involvement of non-technical team members to
help identify opportunities to maximise social benefits,
such as locating metro stations near public facilities,
was constrained by those project managers leading
technical design. Several interviewees reported that
an over-optimism about the risks and costs developed
early in project planning, when the project managers
and engineers prepared the business case. This
optimism also contributed to the view that there
would be no significant impact, and therefore that no
assessment of social or environment impacts was
required. As one interviewee noted, ‘we didn’t make
an environmental impact assessment . . . because the
environmental impact isn’t that big’. Another intervie-
wee involved in project management also acknowl-
edged this optimism bias, and felt that too much
confidence was placed in the tunnelling technology,
‘today we know the risks that we identified, that what
we thought to be proven technology, turned out to be
not so proven after all.’
After the incidents at Vijzelgracht, the project man-
agement team’s attitude shifted from a closed techni-
cal focus to a more open focus to incorporating social
impacts into project management planning. Although
those involved in stakeholder engagement during the
construction period from 2002 to 2008 felt they had
developed a good rapport with the public and had
implemented good practices, they lacked top manage-
ment support and resources. One interviewee noted
that, it was ‘the change of culture and attitude towards
the environment and engagement’ and a commitment
to ‘working together to solve problems and make
decisions with contractors’ that contributed to com-
pleting the new metro line. Another interviewee
reflected on the change in attitude in the project’s
management in relation to the community and project
timeframes as follows:
from a communication point of view, we had been
telling them [the project director and construction
team] from 2004, “make less noise, be aware of your
neighbours” . . . but they always chose [what was best]
for the project [timeframes and construction]. And
then finally after 2008 [the Vijzelgracht incidents], the
constructor said “we need to find a balance between
the people living there and the people working there”.
That was the moment that the managers of the project
decided, “OK, we’re not going to work in the evening,
we’re [only] going to work during the days”.
[Environmental Professional]
Strategic and landuse planning
Many research participants felt that public interest
and the social need for the project featured heavily
in strategic planning for the NZL. The 1960s metro
plan documented the strategic justification for the
project and formed the legal basis for the develop-
ment of the municipal landuse plan for the NZL
(Bestemmingsplan). According to one interviewee,
the strategic justification for the project was pro-
moted as being avoiding future social issues (e.g.
traffic, congestion, pollution, over-crowding) arising
from Amsterdam’s growing population and transport
issues in the long run. Accessibility and mobility were
promoted as social benefits of the NZL, since it would
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provide a quicker and more-direct public transport
connection between the increasing employment
opportunities in the South and the growing residen-
tial suburbs in the North (KPMG 1996). As one inter-
viewee noted:
when you look at the line itself from a social impact
point of view, it is really all about accessibility and
mobility . . . you can also identify the fact that it
enhances the whole network, because it also makes
other kinds of connections very attractive when you
look at the travelling time. [Project Manager]
The Municipality, however, in obtaining the necessary
permitting approvals, focused narrowly on noise,
water quality, soils, subsidence, and associated prop-
erty impacts. Overall, they considered the work to have
low environmental impact:
The part of it in the north of Amsterdam, which is not
under the ground, but just on the surface, you got some
noise, but there’s also a big road, and the road alsomakes
noise. Well, in a legal way, it wasn’t that much of a job. It
was like a tram or something, like that, you don’t need an
environmental impact assessment for that. We did do
some research, of course, we had to do some research on
the noise aspects . . . and I must say also, in those days,
the environmental aspects of landuse plans . . . were not
taken as seriously as nowadays. [Environmental
Professional]
One interviewee reflected on the social changes now
occurring in Amsterdam as a result of the NZL, and
highlighted the limited understanding of the project
team at the time:
For me, the really interesting thing is the sociological
impact in having an old city neighbourhood, like De
Pijp, now being [only] four or five minutes from the
north. That will change identities of neighbourhoods.
For one part, there is a paradoxical feeling, like
they’ve always been neglected, there’s always been
some criticism against it [the NZL], but on the other
hand, there has been a little bit of fear of their
identity being put under pressure, because these
kind of gentrification processes will start, and the
original people living in this neighbourhood will not
be able to pay the increasing prices of the rents or
the properties etc. . . . We see that these kinds of
processes are already taking place. But I don’t think
that they had that kind of idea about these kind of
effects at the start of the project. It was more just, the
aim was to try to connect neighbourhoods, try to
bring them closer to each other, try to develop also
the north part of the city. [Stakeholder Engagement
Professional]
Another interviewee recalled that social impacts were
considered by the Municipal Council in developing the
landuse plan:
There was a very serious point made that the Vijzelstraat,
where the linewould run, would change intoManhattan,
with expensive high buildings etc, so there would be
a change, the height of the buildings, the height of the
rents, the functions that could be there. Ordinary people
couldn’t be living there then . . . So, we had to make
a landuse plan for the Vijzelstraat fixing all these things.
So, you cannot demolish your building and go to
a higher height, it is impossible. So that was a serious
point and it was managed that way. [Former Alderman]
Another interviewee felt that consideration of social
impacts was constrained by the limited opportunities
in the 1960s for the public to meaningfully contribute
to discussion about the need for the project. Even
when there was opportunity to comment on the land-
use plan in the 1990s, the interviewee felt that the
feedback received was unable to challenge the
already-approved earlier decision:
But where do we make the strategic decision and where
do we think about all those . . . detailed aspects, what’s in
it for the people in the north of Amsterdam?, what’s
bringing them to the city centre?. The discussion [during
development of the landuse plan] wasmuchmore about
the people who were against the North-South Line, who
were much more focused on issues for the whole city,
such as the whole historic city will collapse, as it [the
project] is technically very risky. [Environmental
Professional]
Thus, the way social impacts were perceived, identified
and assessed during the strategic and landuse plan-
ning for the NZL was framed by the laws and processes
for environmental permitting and landuse plans.
Stakeholder and community engagement
Stakeholder and community engagement was part of
the project’s mandate, with a manager appointed in
the early 1990s dedicated to looking at the non-
technical aspects and to lead a team of professionals
who would liaise with affected people. One intervie-
wee reported that the project team quickly came to
the view that the project was too complex for the
public to comprehend and give an opinion on, there-
fore consultation prior to construction was to inform
rather than to engage with the public:
It was not participation in the sense of you can give
your opinion and will work with you. No, no. Our
opinion was that the technical project was so compli-
cated and difficult that you cannot discuss it with non-
technical people. So the whole communications was
set up from that idea. [Environmental Professional]
Community opposition to the NZL in the 1990s focused
primarily on the potential impacts to private property
due to the boring, however, some people were also
concerned with the effects of changes to public
transport:
People feared the houses would collapse, because
drilling [boring] was never done before, building
such large stations deep underground, it was never
done before, so that was the reason why a lot of
people feared the project. And only a minority had
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some problems with the changes in the public trans-
port facilities. [Environmental Professional]
At the time, the project team were confident that the
project design (i.e. tunnelling) would address the
major concerns of the public, thus other concerns
were dismissed. However, since the opening of the
NZL in 2018, there have been several reports in the
news and social media that those living in
Amsterdam’s North believe they have experienced
a deterioration in public transport service by having
to change modes of transport. Whereas before passen-
gers used to be able to catch a bus from Amsterdam
Central with a direct connection to the northern sub-
urbs, now they have to take the NZL to the bus term-
inal at Noord, then change to a bus to reach their final
destination (Van Leeuwen 2018; Jacobs 2019).
Other project team members we interviewed felt
the project had successfully engaged with the public,
given that many early route alignment changes were
as a result of community consultations in the 1990s.
During this period there were several information eve-
nings, consultation points, and consultations with indi-
vidual residents and landholders. However, one
interviewee noted that some changes were the out-
come of political influence. For example, the City
District of Zuider Amstel wanted the location of
a station entry for the RAI exhibition ground to be
significantly changed, which was ultimately implemen-
ted. There were also contested negotiations related to
the proximity of the NZL to the Beatrixpark, a green
space in Amsterdam’s South. A politically powerful
group, ‘Friends of the Beatrixpark’, successfully lobbied
to have the route changed. The subsequent alignment
changes resulted in increased costs and risks, and
shifted the route eastwards to Ferdinand Bolstraat in
the suburb of De Pijp.
To accommodate this change in alignment and to
address concerns about property damage in the De
Pijp, the metro line and station had to be deeper and
have a complex layered design, which increased con-
struction cost, risk and timeframe (Soetenhorst 2011).
Because of the increased construction time, citizens in
De Pijp demanded additional compensation, given the
anticipated noise and accessibility disturbance, which
was likely to impact businesses and residents in the
neighbourhood (Soetenhorst 2011).
Between 2004 and 2008, consultation activities
included monthly meetings with community groups
located near the new stations, roundtable meetings
with the neighbourhoods, living room meetings
with smaller groups of 3 to 4 households, and
individual meetings with directly-affected commu-
nity members (such as those who would have bor-
ing under their homes). However, interviewees
involved in stakeholder consultation at this time
still felt that more needed to be done given the
size of the project:
It wasn’t enough, we were doing the repairs and the
construction was going on, just as always. I mean, we
tried to repair it by doing better communication, but
in the end, if a project is this big, with this much
nuisance, it’s not enough. If the project takes that
long, you can’t ignore the neighbours for 10 years or
even 15 years or 17 years. You have to limit nuisance
and that’s what only happened after the houses col-
lapsed at the Vijzelgracht. [Stakeholder Engagement
Professional]
Nevertheless, those involved with stakeholder engage-
ment prior to 2009 felt that they had built trust with
the impacted public. However, once houses were
damaged in the Vijzelgracht incidents, the public no
longer trusted the Municipality. At the time of the
incidents, tunnel boring had not yet begun, so before
the project could recommence, a significant amount of
stakeholder engagement was needed to rebuild trust
and rapport. Repairing this trust was the primary goal
for the consultation strategy after the Vijzelgracht
incidents:
what we really needed was to regain some kind of
credibility, some kind of trust within the project . . . And
now the crucial aspect was reputation, credibility and
belief of people in the organisation. [Stakeholder
Engagement Professional]
Reflecting on the changes in stakeholder engage-
ment since the Vijzelgracht incidents, interviewees
noted the use of new methods to facilitate open, two-
way communication and provide additional feedback.
These new methods included the use of social media
and the internet. Following the Vijzelgracht incidents,
there was also a change in the public image of the
project, as one interviewee reflected:
Technical people were no longer in the media any-
more, different people and it was the people who did
the work. Let the people who drive the machine and
want to go home at the end of the day, let them tell
the story. [Project Manager]
The communications strategy also focused on increas-
ing the involvement of the construction contractors in
the community engagement and media:
We gave them [the contractors] a face, like when we
had meetings with local communities, we gave them
a role in those meetings. We said we have to make
them [the contractors] feel the impact in the neigh-
bourhood, the sentiment, and the frustration. But also
the other way around, the neighbourhood should start
to learn [to know/understand] those people, that they
are more than only people in orange jackets with
helmets on. The moment you start recognising peo-
ple, . . . your relation [to them] changes, because you’re
not anonymous anymore. There’s stories behind those
people, there’s stories behind where you work, so for
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both sides, it worked very well. [Stakeholder
Engagement Professional]
Two other project team members noted a complete
shift in the way risks were communicated to the public,
highlighting this as a shift in public engagement on
key issues and in project culture:
Before [2009] we always told them, ‘Don’t worry, we’re
in control, nothing can go wrong’. Afterwards we told
them that ‘We are in control, but there still are risks,
and this and this and this are the risks, and when they
happen, this and this and this is what we are going to
do’. This was quite a new approach and the city gov-
ernment was first quite shaky about it, but actually
I think it worked very well. Because normal people
do understand that when you are doing this kind of
work, it is normal that there are risks. So when you tell
them, ‘Oh, there is no risk’, they don’t believe you.
They believe you when you say ‘Oh, of course there
are risks, but we try to manage them as good as we
can.’[Environmental Professional]
Although initially stakeholder and community engage-
ment were not a major focus of the project, the shift in
communications strategy and project culture following
the Vijzelgracht incidents ultimately had a significant
influence on building trust with the public and on
successful project delivery.
Managing social impacts and risks
How social impacts were identified, assessed and
understood in Amsterdam’s planning processes influ-
enced how impacts were managed during construc-
tion. Interviewees felt that the city’s strong history of
planning with people in mind meant that they felt
much time was spent considering the social issues of
projects upfront and as opportunities for improvement
(rather than a burden) in planning. However, in the
case of the NZL, the approach was to ‘manage’ social
impacts by ignoring affected communities, rather than
by addressing their concerns, as one interviewee
reflected:
Nowadays we take them [social impacts] much more
into consideration to see how we can get a win-win
situation for the neighbourhood and the project. But
at the time of the North-South Line, it was more of
a burden to face as a project. You had to deal with the
neighbourhood to get the project done, you tried to
get them away as much as possible, keep them out,
keep them silent and construct as fast as you can.
[Environmental Professional]
Despite this negative reflection on community partici-
pation during construction, a key social impact man-
agement measure was the compensation strategy that
was put into effect early in project planning in the
1990s, and intended to address the concerns of
affected landholders, businesses and residents.
Interviewees reported that the existing Municipality
compensation scheme for disturbance (e.g. noise and
property impacts) arising from construction of essen-
tial public infrastructure was expanded for the NZL. An
independent committee was created to determine
eligibility and amount of compensation. Potentially
affected community members had to apply to this
committee to obtain compensation. One interviewee
noted that the types of compensation included:
inspections of building foundations (at the owner’s
expense) with repairs funded if issues were discovered
and it was approved; physical measures such as addi-
tional noise insulation (e.g. double glazing); financial
compensation for those near tunnel boring activities;
financial compensation for loss of business income or if
relocation was required; and individual compensation
in specific circumstances, for example, hearing protec-
tion and/or relocation to a hotel during night-works or
window-washing during periods of high dust.
Interviewees noted that managing the interface
between the community and the construction site
was always a challenge for the project team, particu-
larly as the construction timeframes extended beyond
what was anticipated and longer than what was noti-
fied to the public. One interviewee reflected on the size
of the construction site and proximity to residences,
noting the considerations the team made in accom-
modating local residents:
In constructing a 30m deep metro line, there was
a huge technical constraint, but also to the people
that were living there. We constructed a station 2
metres from their houses. They could literally lean
out the window and almost touch the machines.
Deciding where you make the metro, where it’s
going to be, is the first step in realising what the
impact will be. And then the contracting, how you’re
going to build it, how much room does the contractor
get, how big is his construction site, it’s been
a constant discussion with the North-South Line, how
big can the construction site be. [Environmental
Professional]
After the incidents at Vijzelgracht, the approach to
compensation changed. As one interviewee reflected,
with the outcome of the Veerman Committee and
additional funds, the Municipality became more gen-
erous so people thought ‘finally the city is listening!’.
Interviewees noted this strategy of being more gener-
ous with compensation contributed to building trust
and reduced litigation against the project. One inter-
viewee reflected:
So actually we turned it around, so when there’s
damage within a reasonable area around where you
are working, then we automatically assume that it is
our fault, which costs us way less money than when
they have to prove it and we have to research it.
[Environmental Professional]
In addition to these management strategy changes,
the Municipality agreed to buy the damaged homes
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following the Vijzelgracht incidents, as the owners
could no longer live there and it was unclear as to
whether the damage could be repaired. One
Alderman reported that their personal attitude to
managing social impacts also changed how the project
managed social issues: ‘It helped that I considered
treating them as I would myself.’
Interviewees reported that, although there was no
formal overarching management plan for managing
environmental or social impacts on the NZL during
construction, there was a series of environmental per-
mits that required monitoring and regulating noise
and vibration disturbance on the community. As one
interviewee noted:
The social impacts are, of course, [present] in the
decisions that the decision-makers make very predo-
minately, although they may not even be aware of it.
But we, still to this day, we don’t have a system for it.
Not for building new metro lines, not for building
other structures, not for new buildings. Even now, we
have a very indirect system for the permits you need.
Several permits have social impact management in
them . . . We need hundreds of permits [for construc-
tion] . . . We cannot work without looking at [social
issues] . . . The permits kind of have that function of
an implicit management strategy for the project.
[Environmental Professional]
Out-of-hours disturbance due to construction noise was
identified as the key social risk to be managed by
permits through the construction period. In addition
to noise, interviewees reported that monitoring
included subsidence (related to geotechnical and
groundwater risks) and road obstructions. One intervie-
wee also added that, post-2009, the Municipality’s
requirements for internal monitoring reporting
increased: ‘there was lots of reporting about complaints,
the number of claims, the damages, the compensation.’
Another interviewee, reflecting on the lack of an
overall management strategy at the whole-of-project
scale noted that, while the lack of strategy minimised
the burden in pre-planning, it would have been helpful
to have a baseline strategy to evaluate progress
against, rather than just permits in individual areas
and to have resourcing and flexibility within processes
to adapt and respond to changes:
Sometimes organic isn’t a bad thing, if you have too
much planning up front, the plan can be quite a big
hindrance. These days . . . we talk agile and flexibility,
that is important, but it would be good if beforehand
and also during some moments in the project that you
re-evaluate where you stand and what is happening,
so that you can have at least some kind of parameters
or variables that you can monitor, which you can take
into account to do something, to manage it. If it’s only
organic, that gives you very little structure or frame-
work. [Stakeholder Engagement Professional]
The Veerman Committee investigation triggered
a focus on (re)building trust, and opened the
opportunity for the public to become much more
involved in developing social impact management
strategies during construction. By 2011, interviewees
noticed the success of the changed strategy, reporting
that litigation against the project had declined and
instead citizens were proactively engaging in the pro-
ject to resolve concerns. As one interviewee reflected:
In a way, it is very good that the [community] groups
have been organising themselves, being critical of the
project, asking for accountability and openness and
being prepared. If you look at how we’ve [the project]
been having impact and hindering the neighbour-
hood, and still people are prepared to be constructive
in meetings and think together with us to find better
solutions, for example. It’s quite surprising almost that
there were people still at their homes up until the end,
that spent a lot of their spare time in meeting with us
and in trying to find better ways of executing the
project with less hindrance. [Stakeholder
Engagement Professional]
The incidents at Vijzelgracht also represented an
important lesson for the Municipality in managing
social impacts, as one interviewee described:
And I think that’s the moment we as a project, the
people at the North-South Line project, really learned
that you have to have plans for the social impacts of
the project, even though it’s halfway through the
project, not at the start or before the start. So in
a sense, for other projects, it’s also meant that we in
Amsterdam take social impact as a given, a big impact
in decision-making without having a set of rules or
guideline to follow. [Environmental Professional]
Even in the absence of a formal social impact manage-
ment strategy, the Stakeholder Engagement and
Environmental Professionals working on the project
were able to implement positive strategies that,
along with the revised communications strategy post-
2008, contributed to the successful project delivery.
The potential role of ESIA
Interviewees were asked whether formal ESIA would
have helped improve the social outcomes of the pro-
ject and/or whether it would have helped them in
doing their job. There was a mixed response, however
in general, it was agreed that social and environmental
issues need to be given equal weighting in decisions
about transport infrastructure. As one interviewee
reflected:
I’m quite sure it would have helped during the early
years of the project, when they were seriously thinking
about ‘what this is going to mean to the people living
there, what is going to happen to them, and how can
we prevent that from happening’. . . . the whole focus
was on the technical problems, safety. [Environmental
Professional]
Interviewees noted that many environmental studies
were undertaken during design, similar to the studies
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that may be undertaken in formal EIA. For example, pre-
construction soil testing to identify appropriate re-use
strategies and economic assessments to quantify
impacts on business trading due to temporary loss of
street frontage. However, these studies were not con-
sidered in an integrated way. One interviewee reflected
that these studies focused on engineering design:
the things involving the environment have been there
for a very long time, like protecting water, protecting
soil, protecting ecology. But the social aspects are not
really part of this process, they’re all the engineering
things you want to know if you’re constructing.
[Environmental Professional]
Several interviewees noted that the NZL studies were
predominately focused on justifying and understanding
the cost, given the financial and technical risks to the
Municipality. Despite this, two interviewees reported
that the project could have benefitted from SIA:
I think it would be very good if we’d had an instrument
like that [SIA]. It could be an integrated part of the
assessments you have to do before you do these kinds
of projects, definitely. I think we still have quite some-
thing to learn. [Stakeholder Engagement Professional]
Other interviewees noted there has already been
a shift in the way projects are planned at the
Municipality, as it is now mandatory for contractors
to consider social issues in the construction tendering
and permitting process through preparation of acces-
sibility, liveability, safety, and communication plans (in
Dutch, BLVC):
In Amsterdam, we have BLVC plans. These are one of
these ticks you have to do. But it’s to make an assess-
ment like what are the risks, are we working in the
street, this street should be open, then how can we
manage the traffic better during those activities.
Really, a good social assessment is not part of that.
[Stakeholder Engagement Professional]
When asked about the potential role of ESIA, two
project environmental team members reflected that
ESIA would not have been appropriate nor effective
because of uncertainty in the design and construction
technique, and short political terms, as one intervie-
wee reflected:
The problem is that you want to say something about
the situation many years ahead, and at that moment
you do not have all the details of your project, and all
the details of the way the project will be realised . . .
which makes the discussion with politics difficult,
because their scope is four years and even less, and it
makes the discussion with the people in the city also
very difficult. [Environmental Professional]
Applying ESIA in the Netherlands will clearly require
a continuing shift in thinking about how social impacts
are assessed and managed in project planning and in
urban governance processes.
Discussion and reflections for managing future
social impacts
The interviewees identified three key topics that
are relevant for managing the social impacts of
future transport megaprojects: project manage-
ment and risk management; urban planning and
community engagement; and management and
follow-up.
Project management and risk management in
megaprojects
Much has been written in the Dutch media and Dutch
academic forums about the cost over-runs and project
management problems of the NZL that were faced by
the Municipality of Amsterdam, and how these issues
negatively influenced the project. Flyvbjerg (2003,
2017) and others (e.g. Van Marrewijk et al. 2008;
Siemiatycki 2010; Cantarelli et al. 2012a, 2012b;
Lehtonen et al. 2017; Vanclay 2017) offer insights into
understanding megaprojects, how they are planned
and realised, and the challenges they face. They note
that megaprojects are often characterised by failure to
complete on time and within budget, and by the gen-
erally poor performance in terms of public support, as
well as poor environmental, social and economic out-
comes. Thus, it is not surprising that interviewees felt
that project management and engineering design lim-
ited the assessment and management of social
impacts. However, our research indicates that the key
political decision to avoid demolition of houses had
primarily influence of the project’s outcomes in terms
of financial and social costs to the public. This created
a paradox given that other social impacts were gener-
ated in the effort to reduce the social impacts of pri-
mary (political) concern. Balanced consideration of
technical options during strategic planning to consider
engineering, environmental and social effects, and bet-
ter engagement with the public about the true risks of
the methods to be used, may have helped to develop
a more suitable project alternative and better out-
comes for the public. However, this requires
a supportive organisational structure that facilitates
cross-disciplinary discussions to ensure a balanced
contribution from all perspectives early-on in project
planning (Mottee et al. 2020).
Another contributing factor to the problems experi-
enced was the over-optimism bias regarding the tech-
nology selected, design, and construction
methodologies. The project managers and
Municipality were influenced by this optimism during
the early stages of the project. Optimism bias is fre-
quently discussed in the literature and refers to the
underestimation of the true cost and likely project
timeframe, and overestimation of the benefits in
order to obtain approval for a project, which leads to
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cost overruns, delays and a failure to meet expecta-
tions (Siemiatycki 2010; Cantarelli et al. 2012a;
Flyvbjerg 2014; Lehtonen et al. 2017). Van Marrewijk
et al. (2008) noted that megaprojects often adopt
technological innovations with poorly assessed risks
that contribute to cost over-runs. In high-cost, con-
tested megaprojects, political pressure and strategic
misrepresentation often play a role in ‘pushing pro-
jects over the line’, even where there is uncertainty,
missing information, or a lack of public support
(Flyvbjerg 2006; Sanchez-Cazorla et al. 2016; Mottee
and Howitt 2018). In the NZL, these issues and the
emphasis on technical design and construction time-
frames contributed to undervaluing social impacts in
the NZL’s feasibility assessments and management. As
interviewees suggested, further consideration of short
and long-term consequences and opportunities for the
people of Amsterdam may have led to a different out-
come of the project in terms of cost over-runs and
social benefits.
As van den Ende and van Marrewijk (2019) found, the
underestimation of social risks and the lack of public
transparency about project risks contributed to the loss
of trust by the public in the NZL and Municipality, espe-
cially following the Vijzelgracht incidents. The
Stakeholder Engagement and Environmental profes-
sionals working on the project found it challenging to
change the attitude of top management towards asses-
sing and managing social impacts and openly engaging
with the public. The approach to risk mitigation in envir-
onmental and social impact assessment and manage-
ment (Franks and Vanclay et al. 2013; Glasson et al.
2013) would have facilitated bettermanagement of social
risks and impacts throughout the project. This is because
the key risks for projects are no longer only technical and
economic, but also arise from changes in societal values
that may be impacted by infrastructure development
(Driessen et al. 2001; Cantarelli et al. 2012b). There are
mutual benefits in aligning concepts, methods and glo-
bal standards for project management and environmen-
tal and social impact management during the
infrastructure project life-cycle (Purdy 2010; Arts and
Faith-Ell 2012; Silvius and Schipper 2014).
Urban planning and community engagement
Historically, the Dutch approach to urban planning did
include participatory planning, at least in that citizens
should be included in plan-making processes (Woltjer
2002; Hoff 2003). Participatory planning and consensus
planning use good practice stakeholder and commu-
nity engagement while drawing on collaborative/com-
municative planning theories (Driessen et al. 2001;
Sager 2002; Woltjer 2002). Additionally, ‘inspraak’, the
Dutch form of public participation, where stakeholders
are invited to comment on plans in advance of
a decision, is entrenched in urban governance
frameworks in the Netherlands (Arts et al. 2016).
However, the social basis of the 1968 strategic decision
for the metro plan was not revisited when the
Municipality decided to proceed with the project in
the 1980s and 1990s. Instead, community consultation
and feasibility studies were limited to considering
technical impacts and providing feedback on the inte-
gration of the NZL into a landuse plan, rather than
questioning the need for the project. In the assessment
and management of social impacts, there was
a disconnect between project and city scales that was
never addressed, which meant that the project team
and Municipality inadequately considered the distribu-
tional effects of the project (such as the change in
transport modes for people in Amsterdam North).
There also appeared to be an unfair power distribution
between stakeholders. Not all community members
were able to contribute to the discussion and decision-
making equally to achieve a just outcome, which
Howitt (1993), Vanclay (2003) and Walker (2010) all
noted that both EIA and SIA should seek to achieve.
The formal impact assessment processes and meth-
ods to identify, assess and manage social impacts typi-
cally applied during urban planning were absent in the
planning approvals for the NZL. The Municipality con-
sidered the project to be of low environmental and
social impact (given that the tunnelling technique
avoided demolition) and legal advice was only to pre-
pare a landuse plan to capture the landuse and prop-
erty changes in the local environment. However, this
process did not allow for adequate public scrutiny of
alternative project options, nor the right to appeal the
original decision to build the project.
Participatory planning processes were used during
the 1990s, however, they were ineffective in addres-
sing public concerns. While the Municipality informed
and listened to citizens, many interviewees felt that
these processes failed to build trust as they did not
transparently communicate project risks, ultimately
leading in 2008 to loss of the project’s social licence
to operate and thus preventing further construction.
There was failure to apply good practice in stakeholder
engagement moving beyond informing the public to
engaging them on how to manage potential impacts
(Stolp et al. 2002; Arts et al. 2016). There was an imbal-
ance in power and influence during the consultations
in favour of the Municipality and high-profile key sta-
keholders at the expense of those impacted along the
final route. In the absence of participatory impact
assessment to assess the initial strategic decision as
well as subsequent decisions, opportunities to
enhance social outcomes were missed. Impact assess-
ment, especially SIA, would have facilitated a fairer and
equitable distribution of effects, more collaborative
and democratic decision-making, and better commu-
nity participation in the management of social change
issues (Hartz-Karp and Pope 2011; Esteves et al. 2012).
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Applying SIA as a negotiation and conflict manage-
ment tool (Barrow 2010; Prenzel and Vanclay 2014)
may have assisted the pre-existing concerns the
Municipality had with the public prior to and during
construction.
While consultation practices improved after the
Vijzelgracht incidents, this was primarily a public rela-
tions campaign to build trust and rapport and improve
the project’s image, rather than on reconceptualising
social impacts or their significance. Identifying, asses-
sing and managing the social changes enacted by
interventions through SIA would have provided an
opportunity to proactively prevent impacts and
improve trust before construction commenced
(Vanclay 2002). Where EIA is undertaken in the
Netherlands, consultation is an accepted and valued
part of the process (Runhaar et al. 2013). However,
under current Dutch law, the NZL would still not
require EIA or SIA, although the inclusion of transport
projects in Strategic Spatial Plans and Landuse Plans is
subject to extensive formal public participation and
usually a SEA. As such, consultation plays an important
role in empowering participation in decision-making.
With the introduction of the new Dutch Environmental
Act [Omgevingswet] in 2021, there will be a greater
emphasis on inclusion of people in infrastructure plan-
ning and EIA (Informatiepunt Omgevingswet 2019).
Management and follow-up of social impacts
The management of social and environment risks and
impacts during construction of the NZL was part of the
project management team’s mandate from early in the
project. The project team had dedicated staff who
considered non-technical aspects, including stake-
holder consultation, compensation and the manage-
ment of environmental permits. However, an overall
environmental and social impact management strat-
egy was never established to track progress against
project goals and holistically regulate environmental
permits. This meant that monitoring of impacts was
fragmented, focusing only on particular aspects of the
permits in local neighbourhoods, rather than on wider
social risks for the project and the wider urban area.
Those involved did not have oversight of social issues
to identify where there were potential issues or
improvements to be made. Using SIA from project
onset would have helped decision-makers understand
the distribution of effects and identify which social
indicators should be used to monitor social changes
and impacts at different spatial scales.
The change in management approach and the
allocation of additional funds for proactive compen-
sation increased engagement with neighbours and
facilitated a re-prioritisation of social impact manage-
ment that contributed significantly to the ultimate
success of the project. However, interviewees noted
that the absence of an overarching environmental
and social impact management strategy from the
beginning of the project was problematic, and
would help manage the social impacts of future pro-
jects. As noted by some interviewees, adopting an
ESIA approach to consider social impacts could have
helped develop an overall management strategy for
mitigating social and environmental impacts, for
example, through a Social Impact Management Plan
(Franks and Vanclay 2013). ESIA would have helped
the project team develop a monitoring strategy to
track progress and success factors against baseline
social indicators and in subsequent follow-up man-
agement (Morrison-Saunders and Arts 2004; Pinto
et al. 2019). Adaptivity and flexibility in management
strategies facilitate better social outcomes from pro-
jects and helps manage uncertainty in design and
planning (Storey and Jones 2003; Storey and Noble
2005). In the case of the NZL, adopting this approach
would have provided the team with a mechanism to
be proactive and responsive to the needs of the
project and the people of Amsterdam.
Conclusion
When the Municipality of Amsterdam was planning its
metro system, rapid growth, urbanisation, accessibility,
and excessive numbers of automobiles were complex
challenges that transport and urban planners had to
address. Since then, there has been much progress in
the urban planning discipline that helps decision-
makers evaluate urban transport options and assess,
manage and measure success against social outcomes
(Legacy 2016). Our research reveals that the
Municipality of Amsterdam has learned much from
their experiences with the North-South Line, leading
to improvements in how they plan transport, integrate
urban development with transport, and how their con-
tractors should interact with affected communities.
However, in the absence of formal ESIA, we cannot
conclude from this research whether social impacts
would be sufficiently considered alongside technical
and financial aspects in feasibility studies undertaken
by the Municipality in the future. Furthermore, given
Dutch law, new projects of this type in any city in the
Netherlands still would not trigger an ESIA. This is
because consideration of social impacts by project
managers and urban planners remains discretionary
as Dutch urban governance processes do not mandate
ESIA for all projects. When the Municipality completes
its (ex-post) impact evaluation of the project (expected
in 2020), we may then learn about the impacts the
project has had at different spatial scales and on dif-
ferent social groups, and how other metro projects
might transform the city of Amsterdam.
Even in the absence of formal ESIA management
strategies to mitigate effects, positive social outcomes
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during construction were still achieved by the NZL.
However, the efforts of the Stakeholder Engagement
and Environmental Professionals alonewere inadequate
to sustain the reputation of the project andMunicipality
following the Vijzelgracht incidents, given the closed
communication regarding the reality of the project’s
technical risks and the optimism bias that existed. The
NZL case highlights the benefits of good practice in
stakeholder engagement, particularly in building and
maintaining a project’s social licence. The more-
transparent two-way communication strategy intro-
duced in the aftermath of the Vijzelgracht incidents
presented an opportunity to engage with the local
population in developing social impact management
strategies. The successful social outcomes achieved in
implementing this strategy exemplify the importance of
adequately valuing social issues and risks alongside
financial and technical issues in megaproject
management.
We argue that the benefits of a good ESIA process, in
particular, in engaging and empowering community par-
ticipation, prioritising public needs in design alternatives,
identifying social risks and impacts, and applying adap-
tive management strategies, remain critical to planning
today’s cities. The challenges identified by Stakeholder
Engagement and Environmental Professionals during the
NZL in identifying social impacts and maintaining man-
agement oversight of social and environmental issues
over time are issues that can be addressed using impact
assessment and adaptive management practice. The
application of good practice ESIA, even if not required
by formal regulatory frameworks, can benefit urban plan-
ners in managing the social impacts of megaprojects, if
applied in alignment with effective megaproject man-
agement and urban governance frameworks. Given
ESIA’s project-oriented focus, careful integration with
urban governance frameworks is needed to strengthen
the connection of major projects to wider policy goals,
while alsomanaging local impacts andmaintaining focus
on the public interest in megaproject planning, from
onset to operation and beyond.
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